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Abstract
This paper explores a possible effect of social capital on the relationship between
utility and wealth. Material status sensitivity is considered in constructing the
individual social-capital index. The incorporation of the index into the individual’s
utility function leads to the proposition that if utility is directly increased by wealth
but indirectly reduced by diminishing intensity and quality of sincere social
interaction as the material-status-gape widens, there exists an inverted U-shaped
relationship between utility and wealth. People located in the lower and upper tails of
the wealth distribution are less content and hence more vulnerable to depression.

1. Introduction
Conventional economic theory suggests that the greater the individuals’ stocks of
physical and human capitals the greater their income and consumption possibilities
and hence the higher their utility levels. Thus, individuals’ utility levels can be
expected to rise as society becomes more technologically advanced and affluent.
However, this expectation is not compatible with the rise in the prevalence of mental
depression and with its distribution during the last three decades. Consistently with
Putnam’s (1995, 2000) diagnosis of the changes in communities in the United States
and the impact of these changes on people, there may be another type of capital
affecting individuals’ levels of utility.
This paper refers to the individual’s combination of physical and human
capitals as the individual’s material wealth (wealth, shortly). The paper argues that
social capital is adversely affected by material wealth disparities and its erosion, in
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turn, reduces its owners’ utility level. The paper measures social capital in a manner
that facilitates the exposition of this possible indirect effect of material wealth, hence
the full effect of material wealth, on the individual utility.
Consistently with Bourdieu’s (1986) definition,1 the paper deals with the
social capital of the individual members of the community. The use of the term is also
compatible with Sobel’s (2002) complementary interpretation.2 However, the set of
benefits associated with social capital includes those that are not stemming from
strategic (market-return-oriented) social interactions: mutual respect, trust, solidarity,
friendship, cultural nourishment and spiritual stimulation. Hence, throughout the
paper the term social capital stands for individual sincere social capital. The
individual strategic social capital is taken to be a component of the individual’s
human capital and is included in the individual’s material wealth.
Social capital is likely to be affected by a wide range of personal
characteristics and factors including, charisma, age, appearance, mobility, education,
occupation, homeownership, time-preferences and value of time and also by the
aggregate social, cultural, political and economic structures and conditions of the
community. (Cf., Coleman, 1988; Di Passquale and Glaeser, 1999; Glaeser and
Sacerdole,1999; Putnam, 2000; Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdole, 2002). In view of the
objective of the paper, and for simplicity, the analysis of social capital is focused on
the effect of material-status disparities. The analysis reveals that, as long as people’s
social interaction is sensitive to material-status disparities, the incorporation of the
non-pecuniary returns on social capital into the utility function generates an inverted
U-shaped relationship between utility and material wealth. The underlying rationale is

1

“An attribute of an individual in a social context”. (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241)
An attribute describing the “circumstances in which individuals can use membership in groups and
networks to secure benefits” to an extent that “depends on the person’s connections, the strength of
these connections, and the resources available to their connections.” (Sobel, 2002, p. 139)
2
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that in addition to generating utility from private consumption of goods and financial
security, people derive utility from sincere social interaction. However, while their
income, consumption possibilities and financial security increase with their material
wealth, the intensity and quality of their association are eroded by the differences in
their levels of material wealth. Up to a critical level of material wealth the former,
direct effect of wealth is dominant. Beyond it, the latter, indirect effect of wealth is
dominant.
The effect of wealth on its owner’s social capital is outlined in a greater detail
in section 2. An index that relates the individual’s level of social capital to the
individual’s wealth and community size is constructed in section 3. A community
(aggregate) social-capital index is also constructed. Section 4 incorporates the
individual social-capital index into the individual’s utility function, presents the
inverted U-shape relationship between utility and material wealth, and identifies the
utility-maximizing level of wealth. Section 5 indicates the possible contribution of a
U-shaped utility-wealth relationship for explaining three phenomena—wealthy-people
depression, wealthy people’s publicized donations, and the individually nonoptimality of wealth-equality. It also articulates the implied testable hypotheses.

2. Material-status sensitivity, community size and individual social-capital
Consider a community of N members where, for simplicity, the distribution of wealthshare is symmetric. The wealth-share difference between any two communitymembers i and j is not necessarily known to i and j initially, but is realized during
their interaction. The community members are material-status-sensitive: each of them
is aware of, uncomfortable with, and has an aversion toward, deviations from his level
of material wealth. Hence, every member’s level of sincere social association with
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any other member is responsive to their wealth-share proximity. Recalling the
assumption that wealth-share is symmetrically distributed, the greater the difference
between a member’s wealth-share and the mean of the wealth-share distribution the
weaker the member’s overall level of association with the rest of the members of the
community. In other words, an index of the i-th member’s overall intensity and
quality of social interaction with the rest of the community-members is negatively
related to the difference between his actual wealth-share ( wi ) and the hypothetical
equal-wealth share (1/N). Along the positive range of the personal material-statusdisparity spectrum ( wi − 1 / N > 0 ) people are subjected to intensified tall-poppy
syndrome. The greater the individual’s wealth-share-deviation from the equal share
the more frequently he encounters jealousy, hatred, strategic and deceitful behaviors,
peer-rivalry and media intrusion—emotions and actions that adversely affect the
quality and, in turn, the intensity of his social interaction. Moreover, snobbism may be
correlated with affluence. Thus, the greater the individual’s wealth the higher the wall
of his castle. Along the negative range of the personal material-status-disparity
spectrum ( wi − 1 / N < 0 ) people are subjected to intensified stigma

and

marginalization. The greater the individual’s relative poverty the stronger the stigma
and the higher the degree of his marginalization. In addition, pride may cause a selfimposed withdrawal from social interaction for concealing poverty and avoiding
shame and clemency.
An ultimate materially poor person ( wi = 0 ) may receive expressions of
solidarity from people in a similar condition and care from some compassionate
members of the community. In contrast, an ultimate materially rich person ( wi = 1 , a
person controlling the entire material wealth of the community) is exposed to utmost
expressions of hostility from the wealth-deprived N-1 members of the community.
4

Hence, an ultimate poor person’s stock of sincere social capital is likely to be larger
than that of an ultimate rich person.
The size of the community is already introduced through the equal wealthshare term (1/N). Since this introduction is indirect it does not necessarily represent
the full effect of the community size on the individual’s social association. Hence, its
consideration per se might render the construction of the individual social-capital
index improper. Therefore, a possible direct effect of community size is taken into
account. It is assumed that the intensity and quality of the individual’s social
interaction are also affected by the number of the people with whom the individual
~
actively and passively interacts. Up to an individually critical number, N i , a positive
~
social agglomeration effect is dominant. Beyond N i , crowding and congestion take

over and the diminishing overall intimacy and trust (i.e., impersonalization)
depreciate the individual’s intensity and quality of social interaction. This individually
~
optimal (and desired) community size N i may be larger (e.g., in small rural

communities), or smaller (e.g., in large cities), than the actual community size N.
An individual social-capital index reflecting the aforementioned features is
constructed in the next section. Although the individual social-capital index is
explicitly related only to the deviations of individual’s wealth and desired
community-size from the average wealth and actual community-size, respectively, its
sensitivities to these deviations are affected by the individual’s other characteristics—
rate of time preference, ideology, dynamism, age, gender, appearance, education,
occupation, marital status, family structure, etc.

5

3. Social-capital index
We require the social capital index of person i ( SCI i ) to satisfy the following
conditions:
i.

dSCI i
d ( wi − 1 / N ) 2

< 0 (monotonically decreasing in the individual’s wealth-

share-deviation from the equal share),
ii.

dSCI i
< 0 (monotonically decreasing in the distance between the
~
d (N − Ni )2
actual size and the individually optimal size of the community),

iii.

SCI i ( wi = 0) > SCI i ( wi = 1) for every N > 1

(the social capital of an

ultimate poor person is larger than that of an ultimate rich person),
iv.

0 ≤ SCI i ≤ 1 ,

v.

~
SCI i ( wi = 1 / N , N = N i ) = 1 ,

vi.

SCI i ( N = 1) = 0 (there is no social capital without a human company),3
and

vii.

SCI i ( wi = 1, N > 1) = SCI 1N > 0 (even an ultimate rich person can have
some social capital).

We commence the construction of the individual social-capital index by
considering a convenient specification that satisfies conditions i, ii and v:
~
SCI i = 1 − δ i ( wi − 1 / N ) 2 − μ i ( N − N i ) 2

(1)

where δ i and μ i are positive scalars and indicating the marginal depreciation effects
of the deviation of the wealth-share of member i from the equal share and the

3

Note that

wi = 1 when N = 1 .
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~
deviation of the community size from his desired size N i , respectively. The

magnitudes of these marginal effects depend on personal characteristics.4
By imposing condition vi on this specification:

μi =

1
.
~
(1 − N i ) 2

(2)

By imposing this result and condition vii on (1):
~
⎛ N − Ni
− ⎜⎜
~
⎝ 1 − Ni
(1 − 1 / N ) 2

1 − SCI 1N

δi =

2

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠ .

(3)

For ensuring that δ i and μ i are positive, the following additional condition must be
fulfilled:
~
viii. 1 < N i <

N
1 − SCI 1N

− 1.

That is, person i neither remain in seclusion nor stay in a community whose size is
larger than 1 − SCI 1N + ⎡1 − 1 − SCI 1N
⎢⎣

~
⎤N
.
⎥⎦ i

When this condition is obeyed, the individual social capital index is:
~
⎡
⎛ N − Ni
1
⎢
SCI i = 1 − 1 − SCI N − ⎜⎜
~
⎢
1 − Ni
⎝
⎣

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

2⎤

~
2
⎛
⎥ ⎡ wi − 1 / N ⎤ − ⎜ N − ~N i
⎜ 1− N
⎥ ⎢⎣ 1 − 1 / N ⎥⎦
i
⎝
⎦

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

2

(4)

and also satisfies conditions iii and iv.
Let Wi denote the absolute level of the individual’s material wealth and W
the

average

material

wealth

in

the

community.

Then

wi − 1 / N
= [( N − 1)W ] −1 (Wi − W ) and SCI i can be equivalently rendered as:
1 − 1/ N
4

For instance, an energetic, young, single, performing-art graduate may be less concerned with his
current wealth disparity and more concerned with the deviation of the community size from his desired
size.
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~
⎡
⎛
⎢1 − SCI 1N − ⎜ N − ~N i
⎜ 1− N
⎢
i
⎝
⎣
SCI i = 1 −
[( N − 1)W ]2

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

2⎤

⎥
⎥
~
⎦ (W − W ) 2 − ⎛⎜ N − N i
~
i
⎜ 1− N
i
⎝

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

2

for every community with 1 < N < 1 − SCI 1N + ⎡⎢1 − 1 − SCI 1N
⎣

(5)

~
⎤N
.
⎥⎦ i

Though it is not an essential part of the paper, a community (aggregate) socialcapital index (CSCI) is proposed. A meaningful CSCI is equally responsive to, and
increasing in, the community-members’ individual social-capital levels, but
decreasing in their variation. We therefore based the construction of CSCI on the
average and on the distribution-free measure of variation—the Gini coefficient—of
SCI:
E SCI =

1 N
∑ SCI i
N i =1

(6)

N N

∑ ∑ SCI i − SCI j

G SCI =

i =1 j =1

2 N ( N − 1) E SCI

.

(7)

We require CSCI:
i.

to rise monotonously with E SCI ,

ii.

to decline monotonously with G SCI , and

iii.

to lie within the (0,1) interval.
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So long that G SCI > 0 , these conditions are satisfied by 1 − exp(− E SCI / G SCI ) .
Recalling equations (6) and (7), our proposed index of the community social capital
is:
N

N N

i =1

i =1 j =1

CSCI = 1 − 1 / exp{[2(1 − 1 / N )( ∑ SCI i ) 2 ] / ∑ ∑ SCI i − SCI j } .

(8)

4. Inverted U-shaped utility-wealth relationship

We assume that the individual’s utility is derived from the return on his portfolio of
assets—material wealth and social capital. The return on material wealth indicates the
individual’s consumption and saving possibilities. The return on the individual’s
social capital is equal to the individual’s monetary appreciation of (and maximum
willingness to pay for) the level of mutual respect, trust, solidarity, friendship, cultural
nourishment and spiritual stimulation received from his community. Let rw and rs
denote the rates of return on material wealth and social capital, respectively. While
rw is market determined, rs is individualistic and reflecting the effects of personal
characteristics (e.g., charisma, age, gender, appearance, education, mental disposition,
social awareness, ideology, dynamism, ethnicity, nativity, and family structure) and
community characteristics (e.g., dominant doctrine, age structure, educational
structure and ethnic-native composition) excluded from the construction of the SCI.
The synthesis of these personal characteristics and community characteristics affects
the individual’s ability to appreciate and extract the aforementioned social benefits.
Recalling Eq. (5), the total return on the individual’s portfolio of material and
social assets can be concentrated on material wealth:

9

~
⎛ N − Ni
Ri = rwWi + rs SCI i = rs (1 − φiW ) + (rw + 2rsφiW )Wi − rsφiWi − rs ⎜⎜
~
⎝ 1 − Ni
2

2

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

2

(9)

where,
~
⎡
⎛ N − Ni
⎢1 − SCI 1N − ⎜
~
⎜ 1− N
⎢
i
⎝
φi = ⎣
[( N − 1)W ] 2

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

2⎤

⎥
⎥
⎦

(10)

and is, by construction, positive. Eq. (9) reveals an inverted U-shaped relationship
between the return on the individual’s portfolio and the individual’s material wealth.
Assuming that the individual’s utility ( u i ) is increasing and concave in Ri (i.e.,
u i′ ( Ri ) > 0 and u i′′( Ri ) < 0 ), there also exists an inverted U-shaped relationship
between utility and material wealth. As displayed by Figure 1, this inverted U-shaped
relationship reveals that becoming more affluent does not necessarily imply a higher
level of satisfaction. By virtue of the necessary condition, u i′ ( Ri (Wi * )) Ri′ (Wi * ) = 0 , the
utility-maximizing wealth is:
⎡
⎢
⎢
r
( N − 1) 2 W 2
Wi * = W + w ⎢
~
2rs ⎢
⎛ N − Ni
1
⎢1 − SCI N − ⎜⎜
~
⎢⎣
⎝ 1 − Ni

⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥.
2
⎞ ⎥
⎟ ⎥
⎟
⎠ ⎥⎦

(11)

The individual’s utility-maximizing material wealth is larger than the average wealth
in his community. The preferred extra material wealth is positively related to the ratio
of the rates of return on material wealth and social capital. The novelty is that the
effect of this ratio is compounded by the average material wealth in the community,
by the actual size of the community, by the individual’s desired size of community,
and by the level of social capital associated with potentially becoming the ultimate
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rich person. Up to Wi * , material wealth complements social capital in generating
utility. Beyond Wi * , the negative indirect marginal effect of material wealth on utility
(through the erosion of social capital) exceeds its positive direct marginal effect.

Utility

u max
u~

0

NW

W*

Wealth

Figure 1. An inverted U-shaped utility-wealth relationship

The construction and analysis of the individual’s optimal portfolio of material
wealth and social capital can be extended to the case where the rates of return on these
assets are random. Suppose that the individual’s utility is u = 1 − e − βR (with the

positive scalar β indicating the individual’s degree of absolute risk aversion) and rw
and rs are normally distributed with means μ w , μ s , variances σ w2 , σ s2 and
covariance σ ws . Then, maximizing

E (u ( R))

is equivalent to maximizing

μ wW + μ s SCI − 0.5β (σ w2W 2 + 2σ wsWSCI + σ s2 SCI 2 ) . The construction of the
optimal portfolio for an expected-utility-maximizer along these lines implies that
investment in social capital is relatively large (small) in communities in which the
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mean of the rate of return on social capital (material wealth) is relatively large, the
variance of the rate of return on social capital (material wealth) is small and the
correlation between the rates of return on social capital and material wealth is not
largely negative.

5. Conclusion

By focusing on the role of material wealth and assuming that sincere social interaction
between any two individuals is adversely affected by their material-status differential,
the paper constructs an index of individual social capital. By incorporating the return
on individual social capital into the individual’s utility function, an inverted U-shaped
relationship between utility and material wealth emerges. This inverted U-shaped
relationship may provide some explanation to three phenomena and implies several
testable hypotheses.
A notable phenomenon is a prevalent, neither accidentally nor genetically
caused, depression within the group of wealthy people. It can be argued that when the
individual’s utility level is lower than a mentally accommodating threshold (say u~ )
the individual is discontent. In the case of wealthy people in particular, a low level of
utility is due to a low frequency and quality of sincere social interaction. A prolonged
discontent might lead to depression. As implied by the inverted U-shaped curve in
Figure 1, people located in the lower and upper tails of the material-wealth spectrum
are vulnerable to depression. The closer they are to the extremities of the povertyaffluence spectrum the higher the likelihood and intensity of their depression. An
implied testable hypothesis is that depression is more prevalent within the group of
people in the lower and upper tails of the material-wealth spectrum.
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Another well-known phenomenon is non-anonymous, rather heavily
publicized, donations of large shares of wealth to public projects. In contrast, true
philanthropy is anonymous. An inverted U-shaped relationship between utility and
material wealth implies that even a non-philanthropist i endowed with wealth
Wi > W * can increase his utility by restructuring his portfolio of material and social
assets. Recalling the individual social-capital-index equation (5), a non-anonymous
donation is a wealthy person’s investment in his (and in his family’s) social capital.
His optimal donation is his futile, harmful, excessive material wealth: Wi − W * . In
this respect Eq. (11) suggests the following testable hypotheses. The size of the
donation decreases with the rate of return on material capital. Moreover, the larger the
average material wealth and size of the community the greater the donationmoderating effect.
An ego complex of being above the average, but not provokingly so (i.e., not a
tall-poppy), is also a notable phenomenon. Although the individual’s social capital is
eroded by material-wealth-disparities, the inverted U-shaped relationship reveals that
wealth-equality is not desired by utility-maximizing people. Yet, the lower the ratio of
the rate of return on material wealth to the rate of return on social capital the smaller
the gape between the utility-maximizing wealth, Wi * , and the equal, social-capitalmaximizing wealth, W . It is likely that this ratio is lower for a member (endowed
with adequately matching characteristics) of a traditional, religious community than
for a person (endowed with adequately matching characteristics) living in a modern,
secular society. This, in turn, implies (if all people are utility-maximizers and suitable
members of their communities) the following testable hypothesis: the degree of
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material-wealth-inequality in traditional, religious communities is lower than in
modern, secular ones.
Finally, the discrepancy indicated in the opening paragraph between the
conventional economic theory proposition on the relationship between utility and
wealth and the rise of depression in technologically advanced and materially affluent
communities can be resolved by including sincere social capital in the definition of
wealth.
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